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The European Union at the University of Miami 
 
European Union studies were initiated at the University of Miami’s Graduate School of 
International Studies as a scholarly response to the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, and 
since then have developed into a strong discipline supported by the professors and students who 
dedicate much time and effort to develop research topics, publish articles and books, and 
participate in European Union related activities both at home and abroad.  As a result of these 
efforts, external actors have also contributed to the growth and development of European Union 
studies at the University of Miami. First, in the Spring of 2001, the European Commission 
awarded Professor Joaquín Roy a Jean Monnet Chair, one of the first four granted to professors 
in the United States. The award was given  for his efforts in developing courses on the European 
Union and his scholarly publications in the field. Second, the European Commission awarded a 
European Union Center (one of the 15 in the United States) to a consortium formed by the 
University of Miami and Florida International University.  The Center’s mission is to teach, 
research, and sponsor activities to promote awareness of the European Union.  
 
The Jean Monnet Chair also founded (thanks to private donations, a subsidy from the 
Government of Spain, and the endorsement of the Salvador de Madariaga Foundation) the 
“Salvador de Madariaga” Iberian Studies Institute (as an expansion of the former Iberian Studies 
Institute) for the study of Spain in the European Union and its relations with Latin America, as 
well as the “Robert Schuman” European Union Research Institute (thanks to the endorsement of 
the Jean Monnet Foundation and the Robert Schuman Foundation, in Paris) for the study of 
European Union institutions and policies, and the role of France in the European Union.    
 
This working paper series is one of many endeavors undertaken to enhance European Union 
studies at the University of Miami – others include seminars, hosting EU officials, reports and 
monitors, courses on the European Union, and cultural events.  For additional information on 
European Union studies at the University of Miami, the Jean Monnet Chair, the “Salvador de 
Madariaga” Iberian Studies Institute, the “Robert Schuman” European Union Research Institute 
and the Miami European Union Center, their activities and publications, please contact Joaquín 
Roy at the Miami European Union Center: 
 
Miami European Union Center 
University of Miami 
1531 Brescia Avenue 
Coral Gables, FL 33146-3010 
Phone: 305-284-3266 
Fax: 305-284-4875 
E-Mail: jroy@miami.edu 
Webs: www.miami.edu/international-studies/euc 
www.euroy.org; www.miamieuc.org 
 
 
Jean Monnet Chair Staff:   
Joaquín Roy (Director) 
Aimee Kanner (Editor)  
Roberto Domínguez (Research Assistant)  
Nouray Ibryamova (Research Assistant)  
Julia Lemus (Administrative Coordinator) 
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THE EXPERIENCE OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: LESSONS FOR LATIN AMERICA 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
   
The pattern of Spanish and Portuguese histories has been described, crudely, as a graph 
shaped like an upside-down V: “The graph risesbumpily at times, through 600 years 
under the Romans, 700 years or partly under the moors, and a century of empire-
buildingto the peak of Spanish and Portuguese power in the 16th Century.  After that it 
is downhill almost all the way.  The riches of the American and African colonies were 
squandered in wars.  A vast empire was gradually lost, leaving Portugal and Spain poor 
and powerless.  Spain suffered 43 coup d’état between 1814 and 1923, an horrendous 
civil war between 1936 and 1939, followed by 36 years of dictatorship under 
Generalísimo  Franco.”1 In Portugal the years following the assassination of the king in 
1908 and the subsequent overturn of the monarchy was a period of political chaos, which 
led to 40 years of authoritarian rule under Salazar and Caetano.  
 
After Franco’s death in 1975 and the Carnation Revolution in Portugal, the graph has 
turned upward again. In Spain, King Juan Carlos, Franco’s heir, supported the return of 
democracy to the country.  A transition period, which has been labeled as a model for 
other countries, paved the way for the elaboration of a new Constitution, followed by the 
first free elections in almost forty years. In Portugal the democratic transition was more 
turbulent and included a revolutionary period (1974-76), but it culminated, as in Spain, 
with the establishment of a parliamentary democracy. These developments were followed 
by the progressive return of both Iberian countries to the international arenafrom which 
they had been relatively isolated during the dictatorship. The following decade also 
brought the electoral victory of the Socialist Party in both countries (in 1975 in Portugal 
and 1982 in Spain), bringing a new aura of modernity to these countries. The 1980s also 
witnessed Spain’s integration in NATO (1982).  
 
At the same time, these long-standing authoritarian regimes prevented Spain and 
Portugal from joining European institutions and kept both countries on the fringe of the 
integration process that began in Europe after World War II. In the not-too-distant past an 
adage claimed that Europe ended in the Pyrenees at the Southwest corner of France. This 
was based on certain truths. Portugal and Spain were not participants in the second major 
military confrontation of the twentieth century. This historical isolation provided the 
authoritarian and traditional sectors of both nations with the necessary shield against 
perturbing foreign influences, including the consolidation of liberal democracy. 
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1 “After the Fiesta.”  The Economist,  April 25th-May 1st, 1992, p. 60. Rephrasing a tourism motto that became very popular in Spain in the 1960s, Iberia was 
“different,” both in the eyes of the other Europeans and in the mentality of the Portuguese 
and Spanish establishments.  
 
Long-standing authoritarian regimes prevented Spain and Portugal from joining 
European institutions and kept both countries on the fringe of the integration process that 
began in Europe after World War II. The archaic political systems that ruled both nations 
for almost four decades prevented Spain and Portugal from joining the Community.   
Democracy was an unwritten requirement for applicant countries and that litmus test was 
not met until the collapse of the long-standing authoritarian regimes. Since then, all 
Portuguese and Spanish democratic governments feverishly pursued integration. Several 
deadlines were missed, but on 1986, the eager dream became a reality.   
 
Indeed, the emergence of democratic regimes in both Spain and Portugal in the second 
half of the 1970s paved the way for the successful consideration of these countries' 
applications for membership by the European Community. After long and often 
protracted negotiations, both countries became full members of the European Community 
in January 1986. This was a momentous decision. Membership in the Community had 
been a long-standing objective of both countries since the 1960s. The year 2001 marked 
the fifteenth anniversary of the accession of Spain and Portugal to the European 
Community (now European Union). After decades of relative isolation under 
authoritarian regimes, the successful democratic transitions in both countries paved the 
way for full membership in the European Community. For Spain, Portugal, and their EC 
partners this momentous and long awaited development had profound consequences and 
set in motion complex processes of adjustment. 
 
In the second half of this century, the European Community epitomized in the eyes of 
the Portuguese and Spanish citizens the values of liberty, democracy, and progress absent 
in both countries. In addition, Iberian entrepreneurs knew that their only future lay in 
Europe. Belonging to the European club was a mission not to be questioned. After years 
of relative isolationism, both countries finally joined the European integration process 
with the expectation that it would help consolidate their newly established democratic 
institutions, modernize their outdated economic structures and finally, normalize relations 
with their European neighbors. People in both countries saw membership in the EEC as a 
form of political maturation. It would also help to align the politics of both countries with 
their European counterparts, and to accelerate the Europeanization and democratization of 
their antediluvian political structures. The urgent need for this development was 
highlighted by the stark environment in which it took place: one of the worst economic 
recessions experienced in Spain and Portugal since the 1950s, in a political context 
deeply marked (particularly in the case of Portugal) by the instability of the institutions 
that had been established during the democratic transition. 
  
Entry in the EC has so far brought many advantages to both countries. Portugal and 
Spain have benefited extensively from EU "structural funds," which have been used to 
improve the physical infrastructure and capital stock of both countries. At the same time 
Portugal and Spain's trade with the Community has expanded dramatically over the past 
fifteen years, and foreign investment has flooded in. One of the main consequences of 
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country from the European average. For instance, since 1986, Portugal's average per 
capita income has grown from 56 percent of the EU average to about 74 percent, while 
Spain's has grown to 84 percent. The culmination of this process was the (largely 
unexpected) participation of both countries as original founders of the European 
Monetary Union in 1999. 
 
From a cultural standpoint, the effects of integration are also significant. As part of 
their democratic transitions, both countries embarked on new processes of self-discovery. 
They have attempted to come to terms with their own identities, while addressing issues 
such as culture, nationality, citizenship, ethnicity, and politics. The process of integration 
into Europe has greatly influenced these developments. At the dawn of the new 
millennium it would not be an exaggeration to say that the Spaniards and the Portuguese 
have become "mainstream Europeans," and that many of the cultural differences that 
separated these two countries from their European counterparts have dwindled as a 
consequence of the integration process. 
 
The process of integration, however, has also brought significant costs in terms of 
economic adjustment, loss of sovereignty, and cultural homogenization. European 
integration has had, and will continue to have for the foreseeable future, a profound effect 
on both countries' societies. It has had an impact on issues such as national identity, the 
sustainability of welfare institutions, and the adjustment of political and economic 
structures. Under the terms of the accession agreement signed in 1985 both countries had 
to undertake significant steps to align their legislation on industrial, agriculture, 
economic, and financial polices to that of the European Community. These accession 
agreements also established significant transition periods to cushion the negative effects 
of integration. This meant that both countries had to phase in tariffs and prices, and 
approve tax changes (including the establishment of a VAT) that the rest of the 
Community had already put in place. This process also involved, in a second phase, the 
removal of technical barriers to trade. These requirements brought significant adjustment 
costs to both economies.  
 
European integration has also brought Spain and Portugal together. This has been a 
significant outcome of the EU integration process. For centuries both countries have 
shared a peninsula—but little else. Spain often tried (and once managed) to absorb its 
neighbor. Furthermore, at the height of their colonial power both countries stepped 
heavily on each other's toes in Latin America. These historical antagonisms drove the 
people from both countries apart.  Consequently the two peoples have lived with their 
backs turned away from each other. This hostile climate changed for the better in the mid-
1980s. For instance, one of the biggest immediate effects of membership in the EEC in 
1986 was vastly increased trade between Spain and Portugal. In only two years, Spain 
emerged as one of Portugal’s biggest suppliers, second only to West Germany. At the 
same time, Spain's imports from Portugal are rising faster than those from any other 
country. Finally, direct Spanish investment in Portugal and Portuguese investment in 
Spain has soared. These developments demonstrate the increasing economic integration 
between both countries. It is therefore worth exploring the impact of European integration 
on both countries simultaneously. 
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Finally, both countries have played a significant role in the European integration 
process. They participated actively in the establishment of the Single European Market, 
and in the enactment of the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties. Both Portugal and Spain 
are strong supporters of the integration process and have intervened actively in this 
endeavor. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to use the fifteenth anniversary of the accession of 
Portugal and Spain to the European Union as an opportunity to reflect on what has 
happened to both countries since 1986 and draw some lessons from the Iberian 
experience that may be applicable to Latin American countries. This paper will identify 
the basic changes in the economies and societies of Portugal and Spain that occurred as a 
result of European integration. It will also assess the impact that these changes have had 
on public opinion over the European integration process.  
 
At a time when Latin American and Eastern European countries are on the threshold of 
major changes, with an ambitious plan to integrate the economies of the Western 
hemisphere, the lessons derived from analysis of the Spanish and Portuguese experiences 
should be instructive to scholars, students, and policymakers from Latin America and 
Eastern Europe working on expansion and integration issues. Moreover, the examination 
of these two cases will shed new light on the challenges (and opportunities) that less 
developed countries face when trying to integrate regionally or into the global economy. 
 
This paper proceeds in five steps. I analyze first the integration processes from a 
historical standpoint. Then I examine the motivations that led Spain and Portugal to join 
the EC. I examine next some of the consequences of the convergence process between the 
Spanish and Portuguese economies and the rest of the European Union. I also analyze the 
transformation of Iberian public opinion towards the integration process. The paper closes 
with some tentative lessons for Latin American countries. 
 
The Iberian Countries and the European Community: Historical Background 
 
From the strict bilateralism that characterized the relations among the European powers in 
the years after World War II, until the adoption on 1962 of a common agricultural policy, 
the six member countries of the European Community (EC), went through a long process 
of integration.  For most of this period of time Spain and Portugal were separated from 
this process.  Spain did not join the Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC) until 1959, and in 1962 when the EC-EFTA dilemma was resolved, Spain did 
not decide to open negotiation with the EC to seek an economic arrangement. Portugal, 
for its part, followed a different path. A traditional ally of Britain, it decided to join 
Britain when this country went ahead with the formation of a European Free Trade 
Association in 1959.  
 
The main reason why Spain and Portugal were marginalized from the European 
integration process was mainly political.  Spain and Portugal did not participate in World 
War II.  Their isolation during the Warwhich brought the defeat of the Axis powers that 
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Oliveira Salazar regime in Portugalcontributed to the suspicions that the winners of the 
war already had about the character of the regime that Franco had created.2 Allies' 
suspicions were confirmed when these regimes, as we will see in the next section, 
established institutions that resembled the ideological movements of Germany and Italy 
in the period before the war. 
 
Due to this distrust Spain and Portugal were not included in the Marshall Plan. During 
the 1940s and 1950s Spain was mostly left aside and only developed only some bilateral 
arrangements with other countries. When the Schuman plan was issued in 1950 and the 
European countries were invited to start the integration process, Portugal and Spain were 
left out. The plan was only directed to the democratic regimes in Europe. Later, when the 
European Community and EFTA were created, none of them showed any particular 
interest in Spain’s accession.   
 
Portugal, a traditional ally of Britain, joined the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) along with Austria, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. EFTA had 
emerged as a result of the abortive free trade negotiations, part of the so-called "Grand-
Design" initiated by Britain to create a broad free trade area.  The termination of these 
negotiations by France in December of 1958 led Britain to go ahead with the formation of 
a European Free Trade Association. Plans were approved in July of 1959 leading to the 
signing of the Stockholm Convention by the seven countries. The main aim of the 
Convention was to eliminate trade tariffs among its seven members and to develop an 
industrial free trade area by 1970. Unlike the European Community, it did not include a 
common external tariff. 
 
SPAIN 
The Spanish government followed very closely the creation and development of these 
areas. In Spain a commission was created in the Foreign Ministry specially devoted to 
follow these developments.  In these early years of integration it seemed clear to the 
government that the country could not be left outside of these integrationist movements, 
but due to the precarious economic situation of the country, the rapprochement was very 
slow. During the late 1950s, there was a controversy in Spain surrounding the costs and 
benefits of joining the Europe of the Six (EC) or the Seven (EFTA). This meant that 
Spain had to make a decision about which of these two alternatives to pursue as the most 
appropriate framework for the country.   
 
It soon became clear that the Treaty of Rome was better suited for Spain’s interests. 
Since Spanish agricultural exports were critical for the country’s economy, the fact that 
the European Community had set the creation of a common agricultural policy as one of 
its main objectives, while EFTA left agriculture aside, convinced Spanish authorities of 
the benefits of the European Community. Furthermore, the commercial volume of Spain 
with the six was fifty percent higher than with the EFTA countries. Finally, at the 
beginning of the 1960s Spanish external trade was characterized by a chronic imbalance 
                                                 
2 Tamames 1986, p. 167.  
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agreement with the EC would offer the country the incentive of enlarging some markets 
which were very important for Spanish’s exports, while at the same time contributing 
towards the acceleration of a series of structural reforms needed at that time.3 
 
On February 14, 1962, the Spanish Foreign Minister sent a letter to Walter Hallstein, 
President of the Commission of the European Community, asking for the opening of 
negotiations with the objective of examining the possible accession of Spain to the 
Community.4 The Spanish request, however, received a very cool reception from the 
Commission, which only acknowledged the reception of the letter. From the outside, 
several organizations pressured the Community to reject the Spanish request.  In 1962 the 
Confederation of European Unions sent a letter to Mr. Hallstein pressuring for a rebuff. In 
addition, several Europeans newspapers joined in the campaign against Spain’s request: 
“The EC has to say no to Spainstated the Netherlands newspaper Nieuwe Rotterdamsche 
Cournatuntil the spirit of democracy and liberty are not present in the country.” The 
Congress of the European Federalist Movement meeting in Lyon at that time, approved a 
resolution in which it rejected the possibility of any agreement between Spain and the 
European Community. The Socialist Group of the European Parliament also said no to 
the Spanish request. Finally, the Congress of the European Movement, meeting in 
Munich in June 1962, with the participation of a Spanish delegation, approved another 
resolution which stated that only democratic countries could join the European 
Communitythe Spanish representatives in this Congress were later punished for their 
participation with jail.5   
 
During the following two years there was no communication between Spain and the 
European Communitythis was the same period during which the United Kingdom 
received the De Gaulle veto. After these two years the Spanish government decided to try 
again and sent a new letter. On June 6, 1964, the Council authorized the Commission to 
open conversations to "examine the economic problems that the European Community 
causes to Spain, and to look for the appropriate solutions.” Three exploratory meetings 
took place between 1964 and 1966.  As a result of these meetings the EC Commission 
developed a report on the content of the meetings and about the possible formulas that 
could define the future relations between Spain and the community. The Commission 
developed three proposalsassociation, commercial agreement and a preferential 
agreement.  After several evaluations, the Council picked the third option. After eight 
years of negotiations, on June 29, 1970, the Spanish government reached an agreement 
with the European Community. This agreement established a preferential system with the 
objective of eliminating the barriers to the commercial exchanges between Spain and the 
Community. The agreement lasted for only six years. After Franco’s death in 1977 the 
new democratic Government formally asked for admission to the Community.6 
 
                                                 
3 Fernández Guerrero, González, and Suarez Burguet 1989, p. 145. 
4 Tamames, 1989, p. 170. 
5 Pou Serradell 1973, pp. 112-115. 
6 Tamames 1989, p. 168. 
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Rationale Behind the EC Accession Process: Political and Economic Motivations 
 
Formal accession negotiations to enlarge the European Community began with Portugal 
in October 1978 and with Spain in February 1979. Accession was viewed as a means to 
consolidate reforms in these countries. After almost forty years of authoritarianism and 
very little democratic experience, democracy was still shaky in both countries. In Spain, 
the failed coup d'état led by Colonel Tejero in February 1981 was a rude awakening to 
the reality of the fragility of the new democratic regime. The lessons from the coup were 
very important: Spain still had to go a long way to strengthen its democratic reforms. On 
the other hand, the King’s firm stance in favor of democracy, as well as the rejection of 
Tejero’s attempt by the overwhelming majority of the population, offered good prospects 
for the newborn democracy. In Portugal the excesses and instability of the revolutionary 
period offered strong signals about the potential pitfalls of a transition gone adrift. In this 
context Portugal and Spain’s applications to the European Community sought to 
strengthen their young democratic processes. 
 
Within this context, it is generally acknowledged that the underlying reasons for the 
integration of Portugal and Spain in the European Community were political. Political 
forces were particularly dominant in shaping the direction of events of enlargement as 
well as in determining the terms of accession.  In many cases not only the general public 
but also many political parties had not fully grasped the full economic consequences of 
this integration.7 
 
There was no dispute that the Iberian countries belonged to Europe. This was not just a 
geographical fact. Spain and Portugal shared their traditions, their culture, and their 
intellectual values with the rest of Europe. Moreover, both countries had historically 
contributed to the Christian occidental conceptions of mankind and society dominant in 
Europe.  Without Portugal and Spain the European identity would only be a reflection of 
an incomplete body. Iberian countries belonged to Europe. Their entry into the European 
Community was a reaffirmation of that fact, and it would enable both countries to recover 
their own cultural identity, lost since the Treaty of Utrecht, if not before. As one 
illustrious Spanish thinker has stated: 
 
For the last two centuries Spain has practically been neutralized in the international field. 
Having our country cease to be an active element in the process of world history, we 
Spaniards have lost, not just the necessary mental habits, but also the very notion of 
sharing our destiny in the march of the Universal History.8 
 
Hence, the strengthening of the new democratic system, as well as the normalization of 
Portugal and Spain’s relations with their European partners were critical factors that 
motivated the leaders of both countries to seek integration in the European Community.  
 
                                                 
7 Vaitsos 1982, p. 243. 
8 Sánchez Albornoz 1973, p. 281. 
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Spain and Portugal. The EC decisions directly affected the Iberian countries' economies.  
Indeed, some of the decisions adopted by the European Community had an even greater 
impact on these economies than those of the their own national administrations. In this 
regard, entry into the European Community would allow Spain and Portugal to have 
greater influence on decisions taken at the European level, as these countries would gain 
the right to vote in all European institutions.9    
 
The defense and consolidation of the democratic systems in Spain and Portugal were 
also objectives shared by the leaders of the EC countries. After the experiences of WWII 
the desire to create a unified Europe has been a work of peace. Indeed, the war succeeded 
in convincing the Europeans that national interests should be solved peacefully and not by 
means of war.  In the preamble to the Treaty of Rome the founding members declared 
themselves: 
 
Resolved to pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty,” and 
called upon “the other peoples of Europe who share their ideals to join in their efforts.10  
  
Thus, when the European Community was founded it pledged to protect these 
principles. Whatever other difficulties or problems might be, that was the fundamental 
value and objective of the Community. Because of this, the still young democracies of 
Spain and Portugal needed to be given a positive answer regarding their integration. 
Otherwise, there would be the risk of weakening these new democracies that Europe had 
committed to defend.  
 
This objective was clearly stated by some European leaders, “the accession of Spain to 
the Community emanates from a political purpose, aiming at the stability, at the 
consolidation and at the defense of the democratic system in Europe.”11 The opening of 
the negotiations was an explicit recognition that major changes had taken place in Spain 
and Portugal that needed to be protected and consolidated within the European context.  
In other words, "the political, economic and social stability of Spain was also a stability 
factor of the Community itself.”12 
 
In addition, the European Commission itself recognized the fact that the Iberian 
integration into the EC was essentially a political choice by confirming it on the occasion 
of the second extension: 
 
When the integration to the European Community was required just after the 
establishment of democracy, after a long period of dictatorship; Greece, Portugal and 
Spain undertook, before anything else, a political decision.13 
 
                                                 
9 Garcia-Lomas Mata 1980, p. 135. 
10 Brunner 1980, pp.183-184. 
11 Rippon 1980, p. 107. 
12 González 1980, p. 47. 
13 González 1980z, p. 139. 
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Community, strengthening it southwards, and ensuring closer ties with other regions that 
had been peripheral to the EC (e.g. Latin America).  In this regard, the historical, 
economic, and cultural links of Spain and Portugal with Latin American, African, and 
Asian countries offered the Community an immeasurable potential for expansion of 
foreign trade, as well as a new dimension in the EC's international relations. In addition, 
partly as a result of this enlargement, the European Community would become more 
strongly tied to the Mediterranean. This would affect the Community relationships with 
African and Arab countries. In the early 1980s, these Mediterranean countries already 
bought ten percent of Community exports and EC countries bought large amounts of raw 
materials and oil from its Mediterranean neighbors.14 With Spain and Portugal's 
membership the Community would be more strongly represented in these regions. 
 
Finally, after the first oil crisis in 1973, Europe and the United States closely 
scrutinized all Mediterranean events. In this context, again, the geo-strategic position of 
Portugal and Spain acquired a new specific weight. Indeed, Spain and Portugal could play 
a very important political and economic role in these areas, where stability was critical. 
This process was formalized with the Spanish accession to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) on June 1982, only after a long controversy within Spain over 
whether or not the country should participate in this alliance.15 
 
In sum, the main impetus behind the integration process was political. This does not 
mean, however, that economic factors did not play a role in the decision by these 
countries to join the European Community. Indeed, economic factors were also very 
significant.  The Spanish and Portuguese markets with 48 million consumers, were very 
attractive to the Community.  At the same time, in the case of Spain, the Community 
wanted to correct the imbalances generated by the implementation of the Preferential 
Trade Agreement that Spain signed with the European Community in 1970.16 
 
Economic Motivations 
Economic conditions in Spain and Portugal in the second half of the 1970s and first half 
of the 1980s were not buoyant. On top of the world crisis caused by the second oil shock 
                                                 
14 Katzer 1980,  p. 124. 
15 The Spanish Socialist Party, PSOE, under its leader Felipe González led the opposition to Spain’s inclusion in 
NATO.  When he won the general election the following October, Mr. González threatened to leave the Alliance as a 
tool to speed the negotiations with the European Community. The Socialist government linked the permanence in 
NATO with the country’s accession to the Community and “threatened” the U.S. and EC members with a referendum 
on the country’s permanence in NATO that he had promised during the electoral campaign. At the end Mr. González 
himself supported Spain’s permanence in the Alliance during a referendum, and Spain achieved its objective of joining 
the Community. Nevertheless, this shows that political considerations, again, were critical during the negotiation 
process. See Gómez Fuentes 1986, pp. 41-42. 
16 The 1970 agreement was the framework for Spanish-EC trade relations until December 1985. This pact eased trade 
barriers between both partners. It provided Spain with unilateral advantages on custom matters.  On the other hand, the 
agreement provided EC products with preferential access into the Spanish market.  However, tariffs and other non-tariff 
barriers remained--especially in Spain. This agreement allowed Spain to sustain a positive trade balance with the Ten 
of 305,000 millions of pesetas in 1984. At this time, Spanish exports to the European Community were 43.3% of the 
total exports, while imports from the European Community represented 32.3% of total imports. These favorable results 
for Spain were negative for the European Community, which tried during the accession negotiations to correct this 
situation. See Fernández Guerrero et al 1989, pp. 145-59. 
     11  in the late 1970s, many other problems were anticipated for both countries. Portugal, 
since it was a founding member of EFTA and had lowered its trade barriers was in a far 
better position than Spain. Indeed, the high unemployment level in Spain, which reached 
22 percent in 1986, suggested that any adjustment cost caused by the accession to the 
European Community would have strong consequences.17 Furthermore, Spanish custom 
duties remained on average five times higher than the Communitarians. In addition, EC 
products faced a major disadvantage because Spain had a compensatory tax system and 
restrictive administrative practices that penalized imported products.18 For instance, slow 
license delivery was common, and companies that sold vehicles in the country did not 
have import quotas to introduce cars into Spain from abroad. Finally, the Spanish 
government controlled a considerable size of the economy through the INI (National 
Institute of Industry), and subsidized public enterprises such as the auto making 
companies (SEAT, ENASA), as well as the metallurgic, chemical, ship construction and 
electronic sectors.  All of these examples show that when Spain called at the EC door for 
accession in 1977, protectionist institutions-which were incompatible with EC rules-were 
still fully operative. This situation provided a considerable advantage for Spanish 
manufacturers, which were highly protected from foreign competition.  As a matter of 
fact, in the early 1980s the Spanish economy was the least open to industrial trade of any 
of the EC members. Hence, the participation in a customs union like the European 
Community, would mean that all those barriers would have to be dismantled for the other 
members of the union. This liberalization would expose to foreign competition these 
highly protected and non-competitive sectors of the Spanish economy.19  Therefore, if 
Spain was to move towards the EC average, this would imply a substantial increase in the 
level of trade. 
 
In terms of static effects, the Iberian entry in the European Community was expected 
to result in trade creation in the manufacturing sector. Trade creation was reasonably 
expected given the high level of protection in Spain before her accession to the European 
Community. It would also be the result of the similarity of the structure of industry in 
Portugal, Spain, and the European Community.  Empirical studies have shown that trade 
creation gains from custom unions stand to be greatest “the more competitive or similar 
are the lists of the member countries.”20  Many reports suggested that the pattern of 
specialization in Iberia and the Ten was similar.21 For instance, Spain had been moving 
away from low-technology/low capital/unskilled labor industries like textiles, leather, 
shipbuilding and food, towards more capital intensive industries that required more labor 
skillslike chemicals, or vehicles. 
 
The effects on non-EC suppliers of Iberian integration would not have negative 
consequences for two main reasons.  First, Spanish and Portuguese tariffs on non-EC 
                                                 
17 Hine 1989, p. 7. 
18 For example, EC vehicles imported to Spain paid a customs duty of 27% to 30.4% plus a compensatory tax of 13%.  
See Couste 1980, p. 129. 
19 Imports of manufactured goods in 1986 were equivalent to 11.0% of Spain’s GDP.  On the other hand, the relatively 
closed nature of the Spanish industry was also reflected in the amount of industrial exports which was only 10.9% of 
GDP. In the European Community the averages were 14.4% and 27.7% of GDP respectively. Hine 1989, p. 7. 
20H.G. Grubel and P.J. Lloyd, Intra-Industry Trade, Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1975. Quoted in Hine 1989, p. 9. 
21 Hine 1989, pp. 9-12. 
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lower than the Iberian tariffs on non-EC imports. This would make the Iberian market 
more accessible to non-EC suppliers.  Second, the EC products already had preferential 
access to the Spanish market as a result of the 1970 agreement.22  For its part, Iberian 
exports to the European Community would not have discriminatory effects on other non-
EC suppliers since as the result of the 1970 Preferential Agreement, Spain had already 
benefited from a sixty percent cut in the external common tariff. 
 
Furthermore, given the similarity of the economies between Spain, Portugal and the 
EC, as well as the existing levels of trade, it was logical to think that the opening of the 
Spanish market would lead to an increase in intra-industry tradei.e. an expansion of 
trade in a particular product as the national industries concentrate on a narrower but more 
complementary product range. This offered good prospects for the adjustment process 
since intra-industry trade creation would result in less acute labor adjustment problems.23 
 
At the same time, however, for the Iberian manufacturers, accession to the Community 
would mean more competition. As I have indicated before, in Spain nominal tariffs 
averaged 10-20 percent before EC entry. This would result in a worsening of the current 
accounts balance since it would likely bring an increase of imports from the European 
Communitywhich were cheaper and more competitive. In addition, this surge of imports 
would produce the closure of many industrial enterprises in Iberia and, thus, further 
unemployment. However, at the time it was considered, correctly, that the intensity of the 
adjustment would also depend on the behavior of the exchange rate and on the level of 
investment in these two countries. Spain and Portugal were at the time an attractive 
production base since they both offered access to a large market and a well-educated and 
cheapcompared to EC standardslabor base. On the contrary, for the European 
Community problems were anticipated in labor-intensive industries given the relatively 
low level of wages in Spain. The Accession Treaties reflected some of these concerns. 
They stipulated a transition period on tariffs of seven years for ‘sensitive industries’e.g. 
textiles, clothing, iron and steelcoupled with a slow phase-out of Spain’s quota 
restrictions. Spain and Portugal also received financial assistance from the EC structural 
funds. 
 
Portugal and Spain had feverishly pursued their integration in the Community.   
However, the prospective effects of integration on the Community were not always very 
favorable to both countries.  As we have seen, both in manufacturing and in agriculture, 
there was the possibility of trade diversion and trade creation. Given the asymmetry of 
barriers existing before the integration, the possibility of trade creation was even greater. 
Trade creation, however, implied more adjustment problems, since greater import 
penetration would lead to a contraction in domestic production. This was particularly true 
in the case of the Iberian manufacturing sector. Other economic factorslike the behavior 
of the exchange ratealso played  a critical role in the final outcome of the integration.   
 
                                                 
22 Hine 1989, pp. 8-9. 
23 Hine 1989, pp. 13-14. 
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played a very important role in minimizing the costs for the sectors involved. These 
transitional measures were sought by the Portuguese and Spanish governments in order to 
placate those sectors that were negatively affected by the integration. The Iberian 
governments, however, were much more effective in achieving a reasonable compromise 
in the manufacturing sector, than they were in the agricultural sector. Arguably, this 
might have happened because in the industrial sector the governments wanted to satisfy 
the unions. Iberian farmers were not organized enough to pressure for a better agreement. 
There were also more intransigent positions from other EC members, particularly France, 
in the agricultural negotiations. 
 
In terms of the function of social welfare, Spain and Portugal both had very centralized 
states during the dictatorship years. Relatively protectionist policies and an inflexible 
labor market were some of the incentives that Franco and Salazar offered in exchange for 
citizens' support. Portugal and Spain were characterized by having what Corden (1974) 
has defined a ‘conservative social welfare function,’ where ‘any significant absolute 
reduction in real net income of any section of the community should be avoided.’ This 
meant for the Iberian governments that they had to negotiate long transitional periods in 
order to minimize the welfare costs.  For example, the Spanish government asked for a 
transitional period of ten years for manufacturing goods.  The compromise agreed upon 
was seven years.  On the other hand, for agricultural productssome of them very 
competitive in the EC marketsthe Spanish government wanted shorter transitional 
periods, but the agreement provided for a four year standstill, followed by another six 
years of transition. 
 
This analysis proves that expected static effectsnot always very favorable to Spain 
and Portugal as we have seenwere not the main economic reasons behind Portugal and 
Spain’s entry into the European Community. Dynamic effects, on the contrary, provided 
an important rationale to support integration.  Over the long run, they would affect the 
rate of economic growth of each countrywhich would be influenced by investment 
decisions and by the efficiency with which these resources were used, as well as by the 
distributional effects among its regions.   
 
At the time it was considered that a critical factor in determining the final outcome of 
the integration would depend upon the pattern of investment, which would bring about 
important dynamics effects. Spain, for instance, was already a big market38 million 
people.  It is true that before entry into the European Community most foreign companies 
had already set up operations in Spain mainly to circumvent the existing high tariff 
barriers. Hence the risk existed that when Spain joined the European Community, these 
companies could decide to move somewhere else in Europe to concentrate their resources 
because the high barriers would no longer be in place and they would still have access to 
the Spanish market once it became an EC member state.  However, as we have seen, 
Spain and Portugal had a number of attractions as a production base including; good 
infrastructure, an educated and cheap labor force, and access to a market with a growing 
potential. In addition, EC entry would add the incentive of further access to the EC 
countries for non-EC membersi.e. Japan or the United States. Another significant 
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Since Iberian producers would have access not only to the Spanish market but also to the 
European one, EC membership offered incentives for investment and for the development 
of economies of scale, which in turn would result in increasing competitiveness. At the 
same time since Spain was a highly protected country for European standards, this had 
resulted in the development of a non-competitive industrial sector.  The Oil Crisis hit 
Spain strongly. Unemployment levels were 22 percent in 1986.  Spain and Portugal were 
also facing increasing competence for their main exportsclothing, textiles, leather (i.e. 
countries from the Far East were starting to produce all these goods at cheaper costs 
exploiting their low wages). As a result of this development, these countries were 
attracting foreign investment in sectors in which traditionally Portugal Spain had been 
favored. This situation convinced the Iberian leaders that their countries had to shift 
toward more capital-intensive industries requiring greater skills in the labor force but 
relying on standard technologye.g. chemicals, vehicles, steel and metal manufacturers.  
In this regard, Portugal and Spain’s entry into the European Community would facilitate 
this shift.  Both countries would have access to the EC market, thus attracting investment 
that would create these new industries. Finally, Portugal and Spain would also benefit 
from the EC financial assistance programsi.e., the European Regional Development 
Fund, the Social Fund, the Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund, and the newly 
created Integrated Mediterranean Program for agriculture, and later, from the Cohesion 
Funds. 
 
Expected Effects of the Integration on Agricultural Products 
Spain had benefited from the 1970 Preferential Agreement with the European Community 
on manufacturing products.  However, this agreement, as we saw before, left Spain 
entirely out of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Agriculture was at that time a 
critical sector for the Spanish economy with more that 10 million people17 percent of 
the populationliving from it.  Spanish agriculture accounted for 9 percent of GNP and its 
agricultural output was 16.5 percent of the Community total.  These figures suggest that 
European farmers would have to face serious adjustment problems, particularly given that 
membership in the Community implied full membership in the CAP, and that agricultural 
prices in Spain were in general lower than those in the Ten.24 
 
The integration of Spain and Portugal in the European Community offered 
opportunities for both trade creation and trade diversion in agriculture.  The fact that 
Spain and Portugal had been kept out of the CAP before accession, suggested that Iberian 
agricultural exports to the Community would face better conditions for access to the 
European markets.  This was particularly true given the good quality of these products 
and their lower pricescompared with those of the European Community. On the other 
hand, the expected increase of Portuguese and Spanish agricultural exports to the 
Community would also displace imports from other countries. The main source of 
adjustment problems was expected to be trade creation because greater import penetration 
would lead to a contraction in domestic production. 
                                                 
24 Gómez Fuentes, pp. 44-45. 
     15   
European farmers faced three main adjustment problems. First, when barriers to 
Iberian agricultural products would be dropped, market prices in the Ten would drop 
given lower prices and Portugal and Spain’s potential for production expansion. Second, 
the price of dairy products in Spain and Portugal was above those in the Community. An 
application of EC prices would reduce the value of final production.  Finally, in the case 
of olive oil and wine EC membership would provide an incentive to increase production 
in Spain, but at the same time it would open the Spanish market to substitutes, thus 
resulting in surplus disposal that would have to be supported by the European budget.25 
For Portugal and Spain one of the main anticipated challenges of accession would be the 
regional distribution of agriculture because it would not be easy for farmers affected by 
the CAP to switch to other products given the differences in the environment, weather, 
and fertility conditions. 
 
These concerns were reflected in the final agreement. The European Community 
agreed to minimize adjustment costs by making changes to the CAP. A long transitional 
period of 7-10 years, depending on the type of product, was also established. Another step 
was the development of ‘indicative import ceilings.’ This was a measure that allowed the 
suspension of imports if the ceilings were exceeded.  Finally, the European Community 
provided some financial assistance through the Integrated Mediterranean Program to 
individual farmers who would most greatly suffer the costs of adjustment. The final 
agreement was very controversial in Spain. It was viewed as very detrimental to Spanish 
interests since the most competitive products faced a long transition period.  This 
outcome reflected Spain’s weak bargaining position in the negotiation process. 
 
The Accession Process 26 
Portugal applied for EC membership in March 1977, Spain a year later. Formal 
negotiations to enlarge the European Community began with Portugal in October 1978 
and with Spain in February 1979. Spain and Portugal were poor countries and as in the 
case of the Central and Eastern European countries a decade later these negotiations 
drove a wedge between rhetoric and reality. The prospect of Iberian membership filled 
many EC members with dread. Portugal, fully aware that EC countries feared the 
economic and social consequences of Spanish membership, sought to have its application 
considered separately. Consequently the European Community negotiated separately with 
each country. In reality, however, both applications were interrelated. 
 
Enlargement negotiations proved to be slow and protracted. For Portugal the most 
controversial bargaining issues were textiles (which represented over 40 percent of the 
country's industrial output and 33 percent of its exports), agriculture, and migrant 
workers. During the negotiations Portugal and the European Community signed a pre-
accession agreement that revised preexisting agreements and provided for assistance to 
Portugal. This agreement came into force on January 1, 1981, and sought to modernize 
                                                 
25 Hine 1989, pp. 16-18. 
26 This section borrows from Dinan, Desmond 1999: Ever Closer Union. New York: Lynne Rienner, 104-109. 
     16  the Portuguese economy to facilitate the country's eventual integration into the European 
Community. By that time, however, the enlargement process was the subject of political 
controversy all over Europe with opposition led by the French government, which was 
immersed in a close presidential campaign, and thus viewed with dread the prospect of 
enlargement to the South. 
 
European Community, particularly French, misgivings about southern enlargement 
focused on Spain more than on Portugal. Agriculture, textiles, fisheries, and the free 
movement of labor proved to be the most contentious issues throughout the negotiations. 
Agricultural policy within the European Community has been the subject of historic 
disputes and clashes of interests. The proposed Spanish membership in the European 
Community was framed within the debate of its presumed impact on the EC agricultural 
policy as well as the ongoing budgetary crisis and attempted reform of the Common 
Agriculture Policy. In this regard, it was estimated that Spain’s accession would increase 
the EC agricultural area by 30 percent, At the same time, France and Spain would 
compete directly in the production of fruits, olive oil and vegetables. Hence, French 
misgivings. While the French and Italian governments wanted to protect domestic 
growers, the German, British and Dutch governments supported the Spanish accession.  
 
Fisheries were also a very controversial issue. Since Spain’s fishing fleet was larger 
than the entire EC fleet, there was also strong interest in limiting the access of the 
Spanish fleet to the Common Fisheries Policy. The French government, with presidential 
elections less that a year away, pandered to French farmers, a powerful constituency. For 
instance, in a 1980 speech to French farmer leaders in Paris, the French president Valéry 
Giscard d’Estaing, declared that in view of the ongoing disputes over the British 
budgetary contribution to the European Community they should resolve that issue before 
undertaking another enlargement. This declaration provoked an outrage in both Spain and 
Portugal. France’s opposition, however, failed to receive strong support from the other 
EC members. Britain, a historical ally of Portugal, supported Portuguese accession and 
the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, went as far as to declare in 1981 that 
Portugal and Spain did not need to join simultaneously and that Portugal could join by 
January 1984.27  Despite repeated attempts on the part of Portugal to decouple the 
accession negotiations, the fate of Spanish and Portuguese negotiations became 
increasingly linked. Negotiations between the Iberian countries and the European 
Community progressed throughout 1981 and 1982 over a wide range of less controversial 
issues including capital movement, regional policy, transport, and services. 
 
François Mitterrand’s victory in the 1981 French presidential election did not change 
France’s opposition to enlargement pending an acceptable arrangement for Mediterranean 
agriculture. Despite French opposition and Iberian rhetoric, however, the fault for the lack 
of progress in the enlargement negotiations did not lie entirely with the European 
Community. For instance, the Spanish government was reluctant to introduce a value-
added tax, as well as to curtail subsidies and end protectionism. This recalcitrance 
prompted the European Council in 1981 to stress the need by the applicant countries to 
introduce the necessary reforms and prepare their countries for accession.  
                                                 
27 Dinan 1999, 105. 
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The Iberian applications were strengthened in the early 1980s by the formation of 
relative stable administrations in both countries. The overwhelming victory of the 
Spanish Socialist Party, led by its young and charismatic leader Felipe González, in the 
1982 general election, and the subsequent election in June 1983 of Mario Soares, leader 
of the Portuguese Socialist Party as Prime Minister, gave new impetus to the enlargement 
process. Both leaders were passionate Europhiles and one of their primary political 
objectives was to bring their countries into the European Community. They embarked on 
a series of visits to EC capitals to make the case for Iberian accession. In the domestic 
front both new leaders implemented ambitious economic agendas to modernize the 
outdated economic and social structures of their countries. In Portugal the new 
government soon reached an agreement with the International Monetary Fund to 
restructure its economy and reduce the country’s foreign debt. In Spain the new Socialist 
government left aside demand oriented policies and embarked on a supply oriented 
restructuring stride that sought to address the imbalances of the Spanish economic 
structure. These reformist agendas illustrated both countries’ determination to become 
model member states. The new leaders also used their personal contacts and ideological 
affinity with their European counterparts to make the case for their countries’ accession.  
 
Despite progress in the negotiations, the European Council and the EC Commission 
concurred that the Community should get its house in order before any Iberian expansion 
could occur. At the 1983 Council of Ministers’ summit in Stuttgart the heads of state of 
the ten member countries outlined the general conditions for southern enlargement. This 
summit stressed the need to solve the EC budgetary problems and reform the CAP before 
Spain and Portugal could join the Community. In addition, it linked French demands over 
Community policy on fruits and vegetables to the expansion. The budgetary crisis of the 
Community dated back to the 1970s and became a serious obstacle when Margaret 
Thatcher became British Prime Minister and began exasperating her EC colleagues by 
aggressively pursuing Britain’s budgetary claims. In order to mollify British concerns the 
European Commission issued in 1983 a Green paper on EC finances that proposed 
mechanisms to raise additional funds. The subsequent European Council summit that 
took place in Athens in December of 1983 failed to resolve the financial issues. This 
summit, however, brought into the open the issues that required resolution. This debate 
led to the development of a normative framework that became a new agenda of cohesion. 
German leadership in budgetary matters and its decision to act as ‘paymaster’ for the 
enlargement paved the way for the resolution of standing conflicts.28 During the 1984 
winter summit of the Council of Ministers at Dublin the EC Ten reached an agreement on 
Mediterranean agricultural production.  
 
The Fountainbleu Summit six months later (July 1984) resolved the standing EC 
budgetary issues, set January 1, 1986 as the agreed date for Spain and Portugal’s entry 
into the European Community, and called for an end to negotiations by September 30, 
1984. This date proved too ambitious. In December 1984 the European Council reached 
an agreement on fruits, fish, wine, and vegetables that was accepted by the Spanish 
government. The formation of a new European Commission in Brussels led by the 
                                                 
28 Marks, Michael, P. 1997: The Formation of European Policy in Post-Franco Spain. Vermont: Avebury, 86-89.  
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negotiations. Delors threw himself into the negotiations and assumed personal 
responsibility over the last roadblock, i.e. the Integrated Mediterranean Program (IMPs), a 
Greek demand that sought to provide EC financial assistance to Greece to compensate for 
enlargement. In the first half of 1985 the EC foreign ministers agreed on a five-year 
enlargement linked program of structural aid to farmers, and resolved the remaining 
problems over fisheries, the applicants’ budgetary contributions and the free movement of 
labor in the European Community. Finally, based on a new Commission proposal the 
European Council of Brussels approved a seven-year program of 6.6 billion ECUs for 
grants and loans to assist the existing Mediterranean regions to adjust to the new situation 
created by enlargement of the European Community.29 These agreements resolved the 
final obstacles to Southern enlargement. Spain and Portugal joined the European 
Community on January 1, 1986.  
 
 
Consequences of the Integration 
 
Economic Convergence 
 
Over two years ago, on January 1, 1999, Spain and Portugal became founding members 
of the European Monetary Union. Both countries, which as late as 1997 were considered 
outside candidates for joining the euro-zone, fulfilled the inflation, interest rate, debt, 
exchange rate, and public deficit requirements established by the Maastricht Treaty. This 
development confirmed the nominal convergence of both countries with the rest of the 
European Union. 
 
Table 1: Compliance of the EMU Convergence Criteria for Portugal, 1986-1997 
   1986 1990 1996 1997 
Inflation* %  13.1  13.6  2.9  1.9 
General Government Deficit %  GDP  6.4 5.6 3.2 2.5 
General Government Gross Debt  % GDP  68.0  66.9  65.0  61.4 
Long-term Interest rates  %  19.5  16.8  8.6  6.4 
*1986 and 1990: CPI; 1996 and 1997: HCPI (Harmonized Consumer Price Index). 
Sources: European Commission and Portuguese Government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Dinan 1999, 108. 
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Table 2: Compliance of the EMU Convergence Criteria for Spain, 1993-1997 
Year Inflation 
(% growth) 
Long-Term 
Interest rate 
Public Sector 
Deficit 
(as % of GDP) 
Government 
Debt 
(as % of GDP) 
1993  4.6 10.2 6.9 60.0 
1994  4.7 10.0 6.3 62.6 
1995  4.7 11.3 7.3 65.5 
1996  3.6 8.7 4.6  70.1 
1997  1.9 6.4 2.6  68.8 
Source: Commission and EMU Reports, March 1998. 
 
The European Union contributed significantly to this development. Art. 2 of the Treaty 
of Rome established that the common market would "promote throughout the Community 
a harmonious development of economic activities" and therefore lower disparities among 
regions.  While regional disparities of the original EC members were not striking (with 
the exception of southern Italy), successive enlargements increased regional disparities 
with regard to per capita income, employment, education, productivity, and infrastructure. 
Regional differences led to a north-south divide, which motivated the development of EC 
structural policies. The election of Jacques Delors in 1985 as president of the 
Commission led to renewed efforts to address these imbalances. They culminated in the 
establishment of new cohesion policies that were enshrined in the 1986 Single European 
Act, which introduced new provisions making economic and social cohesion a new EU 
common policy. In this regard, the regional development policy emerged as an instrument 
of solidarity between some Europeans and others. Since the late 1980s the structural 
funds became the second largest EU budgetary item. These funds have had a significant 
impact in relation to the investment needs of poorer EU countries (see Table 3) and have 
made an impressive contribution to growth in aggregate demand in these countries (see 
table 4): 
 
Table 3: Gross Fixed Capital Formation versus Community Support Frameworks 
  Percent GFCF Due to EU 
Support 
Percent of GFCF vs. CSFs* 
  1989 1993 1989 1993 
Portugal 7.7  9.9  20.6  27.7 
Spain  2.9 4.1 5.8 8.0 
*CSFs include the private sector expenditures entered into the financial plan of the CSF 
Source: Kesselman et al., European Politics in Transition. Data: EC Commission, Fourth 
Annual Report on the Implementation of the Reform of the Structural Funds, 1992, Com 
(93) 530, Brussels, 29 October 1993, 84. 
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Table 4: Estimated Annual impact of Structural Funds, 1989-1993 
  Average Annual Growth Rate (89-93)  Estimated Impact 
Spain 1.5  0.2 
Portugal 2.6  0.7 
Source: Kesselman et al., European Politics in Transition. Data: EC Commission, Fourth 
Annual Report on the Implementation of the Reform of the Structural Funds, 1992, Com 
(93) 530, Brussels, 29 October 1993, 84. 
 
This achievement confirmed that in terms of economic stability Spain and Portugal are 
part of Europe's rich club. Their income levels, however, remain below the EU average: 
 
Table 5: Divergence of GDP per Capita 1980-2000 
  1980 1985 1990 2000 
EU  Totals  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Spain  74.2 72.5 77.8 84.0 
Portugal  55.0 52.0 55.7 74.0 
 Source: Tsoukalis, The New European Economy, Table 8.1, p.233. 
 
This data shows that nominal convergence has advanced at a faster pace than real 
convergence. While there is significant controversy over the definition of real 
convergence, most scholars agree that a per capita GDP is a valid reference to measure 
the living standards of a country. This variable, however, has experienced a cyclical 
evolution in the Iberian countries with significant increases during periods of economic 
expansion and sharp decreases during economic recessions. Since the adhesion of Spain 
to the European Union in 1986, per capita income has increased "only" 11.5 percent and 
in Portugal 14.2 percent. In Ireland, in contrast, it has increased 38 percent. Only Greece 
with an increase of 6.8 percent has had a lower real convergence than Spain and Portugal. 
A possible explanation for this development has been the fact that while Spain has grown 
an average of 2.1 percent between 1990 and 1998, Portugal has grown 2.5 percent, and 
Ireland 7.3 percent over the same period. This growth differential explains the 
divergences in real convergence. Other explanations include: the higher level of 
unemployment (15.4 percent in Spain); the low rate of labor participation (i.e., active 
population over total population, which stands at 50 percent, which means that expanding 
the Spanish labor participation rate to the EU average would increase per capita income 
to 98.2 percent of the EU average); the inadequate education of the labor force (i.e. only 
28 percent of the Spanish potential labor force has at least a high school diploma, in 
contrast with the EU average of 56 percent); low investment in R&D and information 
technology (the lowest in the European Union); and inadequate infrastructures (i.e. road 
mile per 1000 inhabitants in Spain is 47 percent of the EU average and railroads 73 
percent). The inadequate structure of the labor market with high dismissal costs, a 
relatively centralized collective bargaining system, and a system of unemployment 
     21  benefits that guarantees income instead of fostering job search, have also hindered the 
convergence process.30 
 
For the Iberian countries to increase their living standards to the EU average, it is 
necessary that their economies grow faster than the other countries. This will require 
further liberalization of their labor (internal as well as external) and service markets and  
better utilization of their productive resources. In addition, convergence will also demand 
institutional reforms in R&D policies, in education, and in civil infrastructures, as well as 
further innovation, an increase in business capabilities, more investment in information 
technology, and better and more efficient training systems. Finally, a successful 
convergence policy will also demand a debate about the role of public investment and 
welfare programs in both countries. In the Iberian countries increases in public 
expenditures to develop their welfare state have caused imbalances in their national 
accounts. Yet, both countries still spend significantly less in this area than their European 
neighbors (i.e. Spain spends 6.3 points less on welfare policies than the EMU average). 
Effective real convergence would demand not only effective strategies and policies, but 
also a strong commitment on the part of Spanish and Portuguese citizens to this objective.  
 
Public Opinion towards the Process of European Integration 
A remarkable phenomena since accession has been the consistent support of Spanish and 
Portuguese citizens towards the European integration process.  
 
Spain 
Over the last 15 years the majority of Spanish citizens have expressed a positive 
evaluation of Spain’s integration in the European Community. In 1988, a year and a half 
after the accession, most Spaniards already had a positive opinion about it. This attitude 
was sustained throughout the early 1990s: 
 
Table 6 : Opinion about the Integration of Spain in the EC. 1988-93 (%) 
     1988   1991   1992   1993 
Is  a  Good  thing   49   40   40   41.3 
Is  a  Bad  thing     13   21   21   26.5 
It is neither good nor bad 
+  Non  defined     38   17   17   14.7 
Source: CIS: Los Españoles Ante el Segundo Aniversario de la Firma del Tratado de 
Adhesion de España a la Comunidad Europea. Madrid: 1988, Cuadro 8, p. 31; and CIS: 
Opiniones y Actitudes de los Españoles Ante el Proceso de Integración Europea. Madrid: 
1999, Serie 3, p. 74 
 
                                                 
30 See "La convergencia real, a paso lento," in El País. Monday February 14, 2000. 
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the benefits derived from membership:  
 
Table 7: Opinion about the Benefits for Spain of EC Access. 1988 (%) 
It has benefited        5 2  
 More  than  other  countries      5 
 T h e   s a m e         1 7  
L e s s          2 0  
No  Opinion/No  answer      10 
It has not benefited        3 4  
No Opinion/No Answer       1 4  
Source: CIS: Los Españoles Ante el Segundo Aniversario de la Firma del Tratado de 
Adhesion de España a la Comunidad Europea. Madrid: 1988. Cuadro 9, p. 31. 
 
In this regard, the analysis of the opinions about the specific effects of EC integration 
shows well defined attitudes based on the evaluation of political, social and economic 
benefits. The data compiled by the Center of Sociological Investigations (CIS) shows that 
as early as 1988 a year and a half after joining the EC, Spaniards held a positive attitude 
towards the benefits of the integration process. Indeed, EC membership has been 
consistently viewed as a positive contributing factor for the better working of the Spanish 
democratic system, for the role of Spain in the world, for the social and economic 
modernization of Spain, for tourism, as well as a positive element to foster Spanish 
exports to the European Community and European imports into Spain. This positive 
opinion and attitude did not extend to areas such as unemployment, agriculture, fisheries, 
and industry. 
 
Table 8: Opinions about the Effects of the EC Integration in the Following Areas. 
1988 (%) 
  Good Bad  NO/NA  Total 
The Functioning of our Democracy  65  17  18  100 
The Role of Spain in the World  72  13  15  100 
The Social Modernization of Spain  70  15  15  100 
Our Economic Development  46  40  14  100 
To Confront and Economic Crisis  40  35  25  100 
The Modernization of our Companies  63  18  18  100 
Our Exports to the EC  44  39  17  100 
Spanish Competitiveness in the EC  10  74  16  100 
Sales of Spanish Products in the EC  46  32  22  100 
The Local Prices of our Goods  22  61  17  100 
The Acquisition of Cheaper EC Products 56  27  17  100 
Employment in General  13  78  9  100 
Employment in the EC  25  54  21  100 
Industry  36 49 15  100 
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Agriculture  25 65 10  100 
Cattle  raising  20 64 16  100 
Fisheries  21 53 26  100 
Tourism  72 16 12  100 
Source: CIS: Los Españoles Ante el Segundo Aniversario de la Firma del Tratado de 
Adhesion de España a la Comunidad Europea. Madrid: 1988. Cuadro 14-18, pp. 38-43. 
 
At the individual and family levels EC integration was considered a development that 
would benefit future generations, in other words, membership was viewed as having 
long-term effects for Spain. 
 
Table 9: Opinions About the Effects of the EC Integration in Individual and Family 
Aspects. 1988 (%) 
 Positive  Negative  NO/NA 
Your Job Opportunities  31  32  37 
Your family’s Budget  28  40  32 
The Future of your Kids  47  21  32 
Source: CIS: Los Españoles Ante el Segundo Aniversario de la Firma del Tratado de 
Adhesion de España a la Comunidad Europea. Madrid: 1988. Cuadro 20, p. 44. 
 
Finally, from the very beginning Spaniards have consistently espoused positive 
attitudes towards the process of European integration: 
 
 
 
Table 10: Attitudes Toward the Process of European Integration. 1988 (%) 
Very Favorable        3 6  
Somewhat Favorable       4 0  
Somewhat Against        5  
Against         2  
NO/NA         1 7  
Source: CIS: Los Españoles Ante el Segundo Aniversario de la Firma del Tratado de 
Adhesion de España a la Comunidad Europea. Madrid: 1988. Cuadro 22, p. 51. 
 
 
A decade after the accession the attitudes of Spaniards towards the European Union 
were still positive, and most Spaniards felt that it had benefited the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
     24  Table 11: Attitudes Toward the European Union. 1994-97 (%) 
      1994   1996   1997 
Very  Favorable    5.9   7.5   7.0 
Quite  Favorable     30.6   29.5   30.7 
Somewhat  Favorable     22.4   21.0   26.0 
Very + Quite + Somewhat Favorable:  58.9   58   63.7 
Neither Favorable nor Unfavorable   22.4   21.3   18.5 
Somewhat  Against     7.2   4.0   7.7 
Quite  Against      3.0   2.0   3.4 
Very  Against      1.9   1.2   1.4 
No  Opinion      6.1   12.6   5.0 
No  Answer      0.5   0.8   0.2 
Source: CIS: La Opinion Pública Española y la Integración Europea. 1994. Madrid: 
1994. Cuadro 2, p. 34; and CIS: Opiniones y Actitudes de los Españoles Antel el Proceso 
de Integración Europea. Madrid: 1999, Serie 2, p. 60. 
 
As this table shows the attitude of Spaniards towards the European Union has been 
consistently favorable for at least half of Spanish citizens. It is interesting to note in this 
regard that 1997 registered the highest rates of support for the European Union6 points 
higher than in 1996 (58% vs. 63.7%). In addition, the opinions about the beneficial 
effects of membership have not changed much. Throughout the 1990s Spaniards have 
consistently viewed the European Union as beneficial for Spain 
 
Table 12: Benefits for Spain and for you of EC Membership. 1994 (%) 
A  Lot           5.1 
Quite           39.5 
Little           31.6 
None           8.0 
NO           15.4 
NA           0.5 
Source: CIS: La Opinion Pública Española y la Integración Europea. 1994. Madrid: 
1994. Cuadro 2, p. 34. 
 
 
 
Table 13: Opinions about the Effects of the EC Integration in the Following Areas. 
1994 (%) 
  Positive Negative  No 
Effect 
NO/NA 
The Functioning of our Democracy  54.3  6.9  20.8  18.1 
The Role of Spain in the World  64.6  5.1  13.9  16.4 
The Social Modernization of Spain  63.3  6.4  15.1  15.3 
     25  Salaries 12.2  44.8  16.6  26.4 
Prices 14.1  54.0  100.4  21.4 
Economic Development  30.9  33.0  10.6  25.5 
Job Opportunities  13.2  47.2  17,1  22.5 
Source: CIS: La Opinion Pública Española y la Integración Europea. 1994. Madrid: 
1994. Cuadro 2, p. 34. 
 
 
This positive attitude was strengthened throughout the second half of the 1990s. As a 
matter of fact, the number of respondents who state that their attitude was more positive 
toward the European Union in terms of benefits and costs of membership increased 
significantly in the second half of the 1990s: 
 
Table 14 : Opinion about Benefits/Costs of the Integration of Spain in the European 
Union. 1994-99 (%) 
       1994   1995   1996   1997   1999 
Is a Good thing     47.1    40.6    48.5    50.3    72.5 
Is a Bad thing       30.4    30.2    24.4    18.1    13.7 
It is neither good nor bad 
+  Indefinites         11.6   16.6   13.3   12.6   13.9 
Source: CIS: Opiniones y Actitudes de los Españoles Antel el Proceso de Integración 
Europea. Madrid: 1999, Serie 3, p. 74. 
 
 
In this regard, Spain and Portugal are two of the EU countries that most strongly 
support EU membership and the ongoing process of monetary integration: 
 
 
 
Table 15: Support for EU Membership and EMU 
  It is a Good Thing (A)  It is a Bad Thing 
(B) 
Index 
(A-B)/(A+B) 
  Member  EMU  Member EMU Member EMU 
Austria 31  44  24  43  0.13  0.01 
Belgium 42  57  18  32  0.40  0.28 
Denmark 53  32  22  62  0.41  -0.32 
Finland 39  33  25  62  0.22  -0.30 
France 48  58  14  36  0.54  0.23 
Germany 38  40  15  15  0.43  -0.06 
Greece 60  59  8  27  0.76  0.37 
Ireland 83  67  3  18  0.93  0.58 
Italy 69  78  6  11  0.84  0.75 
Luxembourg 71  62  10  28  0.75  0.38 
     26  Netherlands 76  57  9  37  0.78  0.21 
Portugal 56  45  6  29  0.80  0.22 
Spain 53  61  9  23  0.71  0.45 
Sweden 31  34  46  56  -0.19  -0.24 
United Kingdom  36  29  23  59  0.22  -0.31 
UE 49  51  14  37  0.55  0.16 
Source: Eurobarometer, no. 48, October-November 1998.  
 
While support for the European Union has been sustained over the last decade a large 
proportion of Spaniards and Portuguese oppose enlargement to the East. 
 
Table 16: Support for EU, EMU, CFSP, and Enlargement 
 EU 
Membership 
is Good 
Trust the 
European 
Commission 
Support 
EMU 
Support 
CFP 
Support 
CSP 
Support 
New 
Members 
Spain 63  62  68  68 76  58 
Portugal 61  52  57  57  71  52 
Source: Eurobarometer, October-November 2000. 
 
In sum, the above data shows that the opinions and attitudes of Spanish citizens 
towards the process of European integration are in general favorable. It is important to 
stress, however, that there is a large portion of Spanish citizens that do not have an 
opinion about this issue.  The data collected by the Center of Sociological Investigations 
(CIS) also shows that although Spaniards feel linked by geographical and affective 
feelings to Europe and the Europeans, they do not identify closely with a so called 
“common European culture.” The reason for this is that despite shared traditions there is 
an absence of a pre-modern common past and heritage that would have allowed the 
emergence of a unified European identity. Therefore, the image of a “European 
community” among Spanish people is very weak. Indeed, they perceive the European 
Union as an economic community, not so much as a community of Europeans. In 
addition, the CIS data shows that one of the key factors to account for the attitude of 
Spaniards toward European integration, has been the perception about the personal and 
collective benefits derived from membership. In this regard, the CIS data shows that 
Spaniards have a utilitarian concept of the European Union—i.e. they evaluate the 
consequences of membership over issues such as living costs, infrastructures, job 
opportunities, wages, etc. and in function of this cost/benefit analysis they adopt a 
position in favor or against European integration. Finally, when comparing the attitudes 
of Spanish citizens vis-à-vis other European citizens, Spaniards support the European 
Union more, and express more positive opinions about the benefits derived from 
membership. They also stress further the need to build a social Europe that should emerge 
from below with the support from the people, and not only an economic Europe advanced 
by the bureaucracy and the elites.31 
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Let me suggest some lessons that may apply to Latin American countries based on 
information from the preceding sections. 
 
Lesson One: The accession of Portugal and Spain to the European Union contains 
both global and particular elements. 
 
The process for Portugal and Spain to join the European Union was influenced by the 
traditional European nation-state rivalries, typical of international relations since the 1648 
Peace of Westphalia. The eventual decision to allow Portugal and Spain to join the 
European Union was replete with the opposing processes of particularization and 
globalization. Particular, in that the focus was on the nation-state, and global, in that EU 
decision-makers were concerned with harmonizing the economies of all of the member 
states to the world-wide process of capital development. Within the framework of the 
European Community, Spain and Portugal are now better prepared to compete in the 
global market against colossi such as Japan and the United States. Further, European 
integration allows them to cooperate on their research and technological programs. This 
process may represent a watershed in Iberian and European relations, and may provide us 
with a unique opportunity to re-conceptualize economic relations and political citizenship 
in Europe and Iberia in new ways. 
 
Lesson Two: Political considerations were the main motivation behind Portugal and 
Spain’s application to join the European Community. 
   
Portugal and Spain both wanted to strengthen their new democratic regimes, and they 
both held the desire to end the relative isolation that they had experienced during the 
authoritarian years. These were critical political factors behind their decision to join the 
European Community. On the other hand, the economic implications of European 
integration were also very profound and played an important role in their applications for 
membership. The expected static effects of the integration were mixed.  Spain, for 
instance, was expected to gain in some sectors-i.e. agriculture. On the other hand, the 
asymmetry of trade barriers before integration-with Spanish barriers five times higher that 
those of the European Community-indicated a strong possibility of trade creation.  This 
was translated into a risk of difficult adjustment problems for many Spanish 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors that were not ready for competition. It would allow 
them to confront the international economic recession from a stronger position. Without 
EC integration both countries would have never attracted as much investment as they did 
after 1986, and there was the real possibility, given the intensity of the economic crisis, 
that they would have fallen into third world economic levels. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
31  See CIS: Opiniones y actitudes de los españoles ante el proceso de integración europea. Madrid: 1999, pp, 131-
32. 
32 Royo and Manuel, 2001, pp. 22-29. 
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Lesson Three: Economic success can improve political ties. EU integration has 
brought Portugal and Spain together. 
 
European integration has also brought Spain and Portugal together as a region. The 
Spanish and Portuguese have finally realized that joining together will make their 
integration into the international system more beneficial, and they will be more likely to 
have their regional interests addressed, as they really do have many common 
characteristics, needs, and goals. This has been an important outcome of the European 
integration process. Indeed, there have been significant tensions between Spain and 
Portugal over the centuries.  
 
The so-called "Spanish question" has always been a pressing issue in Portuguese 
foreign policy. The two countries separated when Alfonso VI of León and Castile (the 
Cid's king) gave the country of Portugal to his son-in-law Henry of Burgundy in 1093. 
These nations have shared a historic relationship based on fear and mistrust. This hostile 
relationship has been characterized by Spanish disdain for the Portuguese, and Portuguese 
defiance of perceived Spanish arrogance. Spain often tried (and once managed) to absorb 
its neighbor. Portugal defeated Castile at Aljubarrota in 1385 and expelled the Spanish 
garrisons for good in 1640. Furthermore, at the height of their colonial power both 
countries stepped heavily on each other's toes in Latin America. These historical 
antagonisms drove the people from both countries apart. While Spain historically 
developed what José Saramago, the Portuguese Nobel laureate, has defined as an 
"amputation complex," in Portugal people thought throughout history that all the bad 
things that arrived to the country came from Spain, including the French, and there is a 
popular adage that enshrines these feelings: "De España ni bom vento ni bom casamento" 
(meaning "from Spain neither good wind, nor good marriage"). In Spain Salvador de 
Madariaga, a Spanish liberal historian, defined the Portuguese as "a Spaniard with his 
back turned to Castile and his eyes on the Atlantic." Consequently, these two cultures for 
centuries have shared a peninsula but little else and the two peoples have lived with their 
backs turned away from each other. And yet, in recent years, there have been signs that 
some changes might be underway—both in the relations between Spain and Portugal, as 
well as their respective relationship with Europe.  
 
Indeed, this hostile climate changed for the better in the mid-1980s. While theirs is 
still a challenging relationship, and not always an easy one, it is unquestionable that 
European integration is drawing Spain and Portugal together. Portuguese and Spaniards 
appreciate each other more. There is increasing awareness about a shared history 
including: the legacy of exploration and empire, the manipulation of the great powers 
during the 18
th century, the incompetence of kings and military strongmen of the 19
th 
century, and finally, the frustration with fascist authoritarian rulers in the 20
th century.  
 
Several developments demonstrate the increasing economic integration between both 
countries. For instance, one of the biggest immediate effects of membership in the 
European Community in 1986 was vastly increased trade between Spain and Portugal. By 
1990, Spain traded more with Portugal than with all of its Latin American trading 
partners, and Spain's imports from Portugal are rising faster than those from any other 
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soared and Spain has emerged as the largest investor in Portugal. By 2000 there were over 
3,000 Spanish firms in Portugal, compared with fewer than 400 in 1989, and the 
Portuguese own over 400 firms in Spain. It is also true, however, that these economic 
asymmetries lie at the root of some of the tensions that have arisen as the two countries 
have drawn closer. These developments demonstrate the increasing integration of the 
Iberian economies. 
 
Following the example of the French and Germans, relations between Portugal and 
Spain have also dramatically improved over the last 15 years. The increased economic 
cooperation fostered by membership in the European Union has also resulted in greater 
cultural exchanges and political harmony. Large numbers of Spaniards visited the 1998 
World Expo in Lisbon, and Portuguese dailies have taken to print some part of their 
editions during Easter Week in Spanish, for the convenience of the many Spanish who 
visit the country during this time. In addition, the success of the year 2000 initiative to 
promote a new and more modern image of Portugal in Spain, with the joint organization 
of a program of cultural, political, and economic activities (including the installation of a 
Portuguese pavilion to host most of these events in the heart of Madrid) under the title: 
"Portugal: A Bet for the Future" illustrates the dramatic transformation in the relationship 
between both countries. These developments demonstrate their increasing integration. It 
is therefore worth exploring the impact of European integration on both countries 
simultaneously. 
 
 
Lesson Four: Economic success drives public opinion.  
 
The decision to join the European Union in both Portugal and Spain was supported by 
all political parties—for the first time in EC history. Furthermore, according to a recent 
Eurobarometer study, the overwhelming majority of the population understood the 
importance and significance of this step and supported the decision.  EC membership 
would increase economic growth, thus increasing the standards of living of the Iberian 
people. 
 
Table 17 : Support for EU Membership and EMU 
      It is a Good Thing     It is a Bad Thing    
Portugal    56     45   
Spain    53     61   
Source: Eurobarometer, no. 48, October-November 1998. 
 
The polls conducted by European and Iberian institutions show that the opinions and 
attitudes of Iberian citizens towards the process of European integration are in general 
favorable. It is important to stress, however, that there is a large portion of Iberian citizens 
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the key factors to account for the attitude of Portuguese and Spaniards toward European 
integration, has been the perception about the personal and collective benefits derived 
from membership. In this regard, the CIS data shows that Iberian citizens have a very 
utilitarian concept of the European Union—i.e. they evaluate the consequences of 
membership over issues such as living costs, infrastructures, job opportunities, wages, 
etc. and in function of this cost/benefit analysis they adopt a position in favor of or 
against European integration. Finally, when comparing the attitudes of Spanish and 
Portuguese citizens vis-à-vis other European citizens, the former support the European 
Union more, and express more positive opinions about the benefits derived from 
membership. They also stress further the need to build a social Europe that should emerge 
from below with the support from the people, and not only an economic Europe advanced 
by the bureaucracy and the elites.33 
 
Lesson Five: EU Membership has altered the Iberian Role in the World. 
 
 EC membership put an end to the relative isolationism of both countries, which had 
been a key cause of the economic, cultural and social backwardness of both Portugal and 
Spain. After years of backwardness and isolation, Spain and Portugal have become 
players in Europe again. Iberia place throughout history has been at the center of Europe. 
After years of isolationism it was time to reclaim their place there. The alternative was 
between the past and the future, between hope and fear, and both countries chose the right 
path.  Time has proven that this was the right decision for both countries. 
 
Lesson Six: EU Membership has given Spain and Portugal a better 
competitive position.  
  
Portugal and Spain took part in the process of European integration, a development 
that would have significant economic consequences for both countries. Spain and 
Portugal had traditionally been countries of emigrants. In 1986 there were over 1,000,000 
Portuguese and Spanish emigrants throughout Europe, and the entry of Portugal and 
Spain into the European Community made Spanish and Portuguese citizens European 
citizens, thus ending some of the discrimination that those emigrants had suffered in the 
past. The Spanish and Portuguese fishers, who could not fish from the Community 
waters, would now have access to them. It would be a way to avoid surpluses of Spanish 
agricultural goods-which reached one third of total output some years.  Some of these 
products would be sold more easily on the European markets. Spain and Portugal had to 
speed up the reform of their productive and economic structures to increase the 
productivity of their labor force-which at the time was half of the average of the European 
Community. Integration would facilitate this process and improve the competitive 
position of the country. In fact, Spain was a highly protected country by European 
standards.  This was translated into a non-competitive industrial sector.  The Oil Crisis hit 
Spain strongly.  The unemployment level was 22 percent on 1986.  Spain was also facing 
                                                 
33  See CIS: Opiniones y actitudes de los españoles ante el proceso de integración europea. Madrid: 1999, pp, 131-
32. 
     31  increasing competence for its main exports--clothing, textiles, leather.  Countries from the 
Far East were starting to produce all these goods at cheaper costs exploiting their low 
wages.  These countries were attracting foreign investment in sectors in which 
traditionally Spain and Portugal had been favored.  This situation convinced the Spanish 
and Portuguese leaders that the country had to shift toward more capital-intensive 
industries requiring greater skills in the labor force but relying on standard technology 
(e.g. chemicals, vehicles, steel and metal manufacturers).  Spain’s entry into the European 
Community would facilitate this shift.  Spain would have access to the EC market, thus 
attracting investment that would create these new industries.  Furthermore, Spain and 
Portugal would also receive financial assistance from the EC structural funds the 
European Regional Development Fund, the Social Fund, the Agriculture Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund, and the newly created Integrated Mediterranean Program for agriculture. 
The interdependence of the markets and economies, offered no other alternative if 
Portugal and Spain wanted to become competitive in the world market.  This led to the 
development of economies of scale. That is, Spanish and Portuguese producers would 
have access not only to their respective national markets but also to the European one.  
This would offer incentives for investment and for the development of economies of 
scale, which in turn would result in more competitive products in the European market. 
Finally, no matter how impressive the economic results might seem, Spain and Portugal 
still have a long way in reaching the EC average in wealth.  
 
Lesson Seven: Real Economic Convergence is a Slow Process. 
 
Over two years ago, on January 1, 1999, Spain and Portugal became founding 
members of the European Monetary Union. At the end, both countries, which as late as 
1997 were considered outside candidates for joining the Euro-zone, fulfilled the inflation, 
interest rate, debt, exchange rate, and public deficit requirements established in the 
Maastricht Treaty. This development confirmed the nominal convergence of both 
countries with the rest of the European Union. Nominal economic convergence vis-à-vis 
the European average, however, has advanced at a faster pace than real convergence.       
 
As we have seen, for the Iberian countries to increase their living standards to the EU 
average, it is necessary that their economies grow faster that the other countries. This will 
require further liberalization of their labor and service markets and better utilization of 
their productive resources. In addition, convergence will also demand institutional 
reforms in R&D policies, in education, and in civil infrastructures, as well as further 
innovation, an increase in business capabilities, more investment in information 
technology, and better and more efficient training systems. Finally, a successful 
convergence policy will also demand a debate about the role of public investment and 
welfare programs in both countries. In the Iberian countries increases in public 
expenditures to develop their welfare state have caused imbalances in their national 
accounts. Yet, both countries still spend significantly less in this area than their European 
neighbors (i.e. Spain spends 6.3 points less on welfare policies than the EMU average). 
Effective real convergence would demand not only effective strategies and policies, but 
also a strong commitment on the part of Spanish and Portuguese citizens to this objective. 
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integrated internationally and to modernize, thus securing convergence in nominal terms 
with Europe. However, in spite of this progress Iberian economies still have to achieve 
convergence in real terms, reconciling convergence in productivity with the creation of 
employment. In terms of convergence and growth in the long run, while contributing to 
important progress, fifteen years have not been long enough. 
 
Lesson Eight: European Integration has not led to convergence in social expenditures 
 
While social expenditures have increased in both countries over the last two decades, 
the gap between the Iberian countries (particularly Spain) and the European Union in 
social expenditures has not narrowed: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of social protection expenditure, % GDP, 1980-1997 
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Source: Guillén et al., p. 4. Data from: Eudor-Stat 1997 and Eurostat 2000. 
 
At the same time, it is worth noting that European Funds have helped to develop social 
policies and the construction of infrastructures related to them. They have also enhanced 
new undertakings in social policy. Without these funds, the increase .in social 
expenditures would not have been sustainable. The absence of such funds for Latin 
American countries will significantly hinder efforts to develop and expand their welfare 
states. 
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As I indicated in the introduction, entry into the European Union has so far brought 
many advantages to both countries. Portugal and Spain have benefited extensively from 
the European Union's cohesion policies, which have contributed to improve the physical 
infrastructure and capital stock of both countries. At the same time Portugal and Spain's 
trade with the Community has expanded dramatically over the past fifteen years, and 
foreign investment has greatly increased. One of the main consequences of these 
developments has been a reduction in the economic differentials that separated both 
countries from the European average. For instance, since 1986, Portugal's average per 
capita income has grown from 56 percent of the EU average to about 74 percent, while 
Spain's has grown to 83 percent. The culmination of this process was the (largely 
unexpected) participation of both countries as original founders of the European 
Monetary Union in 1999. 
 
From a social and cultural standpoint, the effects of integration are also significant. As 
part of their democratic transitions, both countries embarked on new processes of self-
discovery. They have begun to come to terms with their own identities, while addressing 
issues such as culture, nationality, citizenship, ethnicity, and politics. The process of 
integration into Europe has greatly influenced these developments. At the dawn of the 
new millennium it would not be an exaggeration to say that the Spaniards and the 
Portuguese have become "mainstream Europeans," and that many of the cultural 
differences that separated these two countries from their European counterparts have 
faded as a consequence of the integration process. 
 
The process of integration, however, has also brought significant costs in terms of 
economic adjustment, loss of sovereignty, and cultural homogenization. European 
integration has had, and will continue to have for the foreseeable future, a profound effect 
on both countries' societies. It has had an impact on issues such as national identity, the 
sustainability of welfare institutions, and the adjustment of political and economic 
structures. Under the terms of the accession agreements signed in 1985 both countries had 
to undertake significant steps to align their legislation on industrial, agriculture, 
economic, and financial polices to that of the European Community. These accession 
agreements also established significant transition periods to cushion the negative effects 
of integration. This meant that both countries had to phase in tariffs and prices, and 
approve tax changes (including the establishment of a VAT) that the rest of the 
Community had already put in place. This process also involved, in a second phase, the 
removal of technical barriers to trade. These requirements brought significant adjustment 
costs to both economies.  
 
The Iberian enlargement illustrates that EU integration required a set of measures 
including: increasing competition, privatization of public enterprises, industrial 
restructuring, and deregulation. These measures have translated into efficiency gains, 
which have been reinforced by a more stable macroeconomic framework. At the same 
time, lower inflation and fiscal consolidation have led to lower real (and nominal) interest 
rates, which, in turn, have resulted in a higher sustainable growth. However, there have 
also been short-term costs associated with monetary integration. Indeed, the losses of the 
     34  exchange rate and of monetary sovereignty require a process of nominal convergence and 
fiscal consolidation, as well as higher cyclical correlation, for euro membership to be 
successful. This should be taken into account for future Latin American economies. 
Argentina proves another example of this. The Iberian enlargement shows that prior to 
monetary integration, candidates must carry out a process of modernization and nominal 
convergence without fixing their exchange rates. Finally, as I previously indicated, the 
role of Structural Funds has also been crucial. These allow for the construction of public 
infrastructure vital for private sector productivity and real convergence. 
 
Lesson Ten: The key role of structural and cohesion funds. 
 
The structural funds and cohesion funds are the instruments designed by the European 
Union to develop social and cohesion policies within the European Union. The cohesion 
funds were established in the Maastricht Treaty in order to compensate for the efforts that 
countries with the lowest per capita income relative to the European Union (Ireland, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain) would need to make to comply with the nominal 
convergence criteria. These funds, which amount to just over one-third of the EU budget, 
have contributed significantly to reduce regional disparities and foster convergence within 
the European Union. At the same time, they have played a prominent role in developing 
the factors that improve the competitiveness and determine the potential growth of the 
least developed regions.34 
 
Structural and Cohesion Funds 
Greece Ireland Spain Portugal
GDP %
1989-93 2,6 2,5 0,7 3,0
1994-99 3,0 1,9 1,5 3,3
2000-06 2,8 0,6 1,3 2,9
% on Gross Fixed Capital Formation
1989-93 11,8 15,0 2,9 12,4
1994-99 14,6 9,6 6,7 14,2
2000-06 12,3 2,6 5,5 11,4  
Source: Sebastian 2001, p. 25. Date from: European Commission. Estimates 
based on Eurostat data and forecast for 2000-06. 
 
                                                 
34 See Sebastian, Miguel, 2001: “Spain in the EU: Fifteen Years May not be Enough” p. 25-26. Paper presented at the 
conference From Isolation to Europe: 15 Years of Spanish and Portuguese Membership in the European Union. 
Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University. November 2-3. 
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in Portugal.35 EU funding has allowed rates of public investment to remain relatively 
stable since the mid-1980s.  The percentage of public investment financed by EU funds 
has been rising since 1985, to reach average values of 42% for Portugal, and 15% for 
Spain. It has been estimated that the impact of these funds on the ratio of public 
investment in the Spanish economy in the past few years has been 0.5% higher as a 
consequence of EU funding, which in turn had a positive effect on private investment and 
per capita income in the long run.36 Moreover, the European Commission has estimated 
that the impact of EU structural funds on GDP growth and employment has been 
significant: GDP rose in 1999 by 9.9% in Portugal and 3.1% in Spain. In the absence of 
these funds, economic integration in the Americas is bound to be far slower and 
unbalanced. 
 
Lesson Eleven: Financial institutional reform per se will not produce the necessary 
institutional reforms in other areas. 
Financial institutional reform has not forced institutional changes in other areas (i.e. 
the labor market, or fiscal policies). The virtual collapse of the European Monetary 
System in 1982, caused in part by successive devaluations of the Iberian currencies, 
showed the limits of financial and monetary instruments to impose institutional reforms 
in other areas and to balance domestic and external economic objectives. This is a 
potential danger. Argentina is also a clear example of a currency board that did not force 
institutional change in other areas. Institutional reforms require action on the part of the 
governments that are willing to pay the short-term political price for unpopular policies. 
 
Lesson Twelve: The democratic pre-requirement for membership was a powerful 
incentive for democratization. 
 
As we have seen, long-standing authoritarian regimes prevented Spain and Portugal 
from joining European organizations and kept both countries on the fringe of the 
integration process that began in Europe after World War II. The emergence of 
democratic regimes in both Spain and Portugal in the second half of the 1970s paved the 
way for the successful consideration of these countries' applications for membership by 
the European Community. This was a prerequisite. As long as the political setting of 
these countries remained authoritarian, membership was not feasible. This was a 
powerful incentive for democratization and also for the consolidation of democratic 
institutions (i.e., the failure of the 1981 coup d’etat in Spain and the revolutionary attempt 
in Portugal). While other agreements (i.e. the North American Free Trade Agreement - 
NAFTA) have left aside such a precondition, this would provide a powerful incentive for 
Latin American countries to consolidate their democratic processes and avoid 
authoritarian temptations. 
                                                 
35 As Sebastian indicates (2001, pp. 25-26), “this is set to fall slightly in the period 2000-2006, to 1.3% of GDP. The 
decline reflects, on the one hand, a reduction in structural funds over the new programming horizon (structural funds 
will represent around 0.3% of EU GDP in 2006, compared with 0.45% in 1999) and, on the other hand, the impact of 
enlargement (accession aid). This fall-off in funding will clearly affect the long-term growth of the Iberian economies.” 
36 Sebastian, p 26. 
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Conclusions 
 
When Portugal and Spain applied to the European Community this decision was 
supported by all political partiesfor the first time in EC history. The overwhelming 
majority of the population understood the importance and significance of this step and 
supported it. After years of backwardness and isolation, Spain and Portugal wanted to 
become players in Europe again. Iberia’s place throughout history has been at the center 
of Europe. After years of isolationism it was time to reclaim its place there. The 
alternative was between the past and the future, between hope and fear, and both 
countries chose the right path.  Time has proven that this was the right decision.  The 
interdependence of the markets and the economies, offered no other alternative if 
Portugal and Spain wanted to become competitive in the world market.   
 
Throughout this paper I have analyzed the main political and economic factors that 
motivated the accession to the European Community. I have showed that political 
considerations were the main motivation behind Portugal and Spain’s application to join 
the European Community. Their wish to strengthen the new democratic regimes, coupled 
with their desire to put an end to the relative isolation that both countries had suffered 
during the authoritarian years, were critical factors behind their desire to join the 
European Community. 
  
On the other hand, the economic implications of European integration were also very 
profound and played an important role in their application for membership. The expected 
static effects of the integration were mixed. In addition, the asymmetry of trade barriers 
before integration-with Spanish barriers five times higher that those of the European 
Community-indicated a strong possibility of trade creation. This was translated into a risk 
of difficult adjustment problems for many Iberian manufacturing and agricultural sectors 
that were not ready for competition.   
 
The advantages and benefits that the Iberian countries expected from their integration 
into the European Community clearly offset the disadvantages:37 
 
1.  EC membership contributed to the termination of secular isolationism of both 
countries, which had been one of the roots of both countries’ economic, cultural 
and social backwardness. 
2.  Membership has allowed them to confront the international economic recessions 
of the 1980s-1990s from a stronger position. Without EC/EU integration both 
countries would have never attracted as much investment as they did after 1986, 
and there was the real possibility, given the intensity of the economic crises, that 
they would have fallen into third world economic levels. 
3.  Portugal and Spain have taken part in the process of European integration. They 
have become significant players and have been able to influence important 
                                                 
37 See Gómez Fuentes, pp. 47-48. 
     37  decisions (such as the establishment of the cohesion funds) that have had 
significant consequences for both countries. 
4.  The EU framework has better prepared Spain and Portugal to compete in the 
global market against colossi such as Japan and the United States. European 
integration has allowed both countries to cooperate and benefit from European 
education, research and technological programs. 
5.  Spain and Portugal had traditionally been countries of emigrants. In 1986 there 
were over 600,000 Spanish emigrants throughout Europe. EU membership has 
contributed to better economic performance, which has provided better 
opportunities for Iberian citizens, and this helped to reverse this historical pattern. 
In addition, EC/EU membership has made Spanish and Portuguese citizens 
European citizens, thus ending some of the discrimination that those emigrants 
had suffered in the past. 
6.  Membership has given the Spanish and Portuguese fish, agricultural, industrial 
products, and services access to European markets.  
7.  EU membership has forced Spain and Portugal to speed up the reform of their 
productive and economic structures, in order to increase the productivity of their 
labor force.  
8.  EU accession helped consolidate new democratic institutions. 
9.  Finally, EU membership has increased economic growth, thus improving the 
standards of living of the Iberian people. As we have seen, after Portugal and 
Spain joined the Community, GDP rose faster, investment soared, unemployment 
decreased, inflation was kept under control, and the deficit in the current accounts 
balance was sharply reduced. The Iberian governments' actions to liberalize these 
economies and open their countries to the European Community contributed to 
this remarkable turnaround. As expected, much of the expansion was financed 
from abroad. The flow of foreign direct investment into Spain doubled over the 
first two years of membership and reached $80 billion in the period 1986-1991.38 
Between 1970 and 1998 foreign investment in Spain grew from 1% of GDP to 
more than percent. 
 
No matter how impressive these results might seem, Spain and Portugal still have a 
long way to go to reach the EC average wealth. For instance, as I have mentioned before, 
since 1986, Portugal's average per capita income has grown from 56 percent of the EU 
average to about 74 percent, while Spain's has grown to 83 percent. In Spain, 
unemployment currently stands at 12.5 percent of the labor force, and is the highest in the 
Union. Imports have been growing faster than exports and the trade deficit has tripled. 
The competitive position of both countries is also worrisome. Spending on R&D is still 
under one percent of GDP-low compared with the richer EU countries. Spending on 
training and education of workers is insufficient too.  Moreover, low wages-which was 
one of the most attractive factors for investors-have risen over the last decade.  Hence 
unit labor costs have been increasing faster than those of its main EU competitors. 
Indeed, wages are still lower than in Germany, but they are roughly equivalent to those in 
Britain.  Finally, labor flexibility is still hampered by rigid labor laws. 
 
                                                 
38 “After the Fiesta,” p. 3, and Hine 1989, p. 23. 
     38  This is not to say, however, that Spain and Portugal are worse off after the 
integrationas some claim. Economic adjustment was unavoidable and should have taken 
place anyway-within the European Union or out of it-if both countries wanted to become 
competitive. EC entry accelerated some tough economic measures, and has aggravated 
some of the already existing unbalances.  However, Portugal and Spain’s entry into the 
EC/EU attracted billions of dollars in foreign investment that helped to alleviate 
adjustment problems. 
 
The path towards ‘convergence’ has been (and will be in the foreseeable future) long 
and winding. Over the last two decades, Iberian governments have been forced to reform 
their pension and welfare systems-i.e., freezing health spending, cutting subsidies, and 
setting restrictions on the entitlement to unemployment pay. They also have had to 
privatize most publics companies, to more efficiently enforce the laws to stop 
unemployment fraudwhich is still rampantand to cut excessive bureaucracy. All these 
measures led to social problems because the unions did not accept these reforms easily. 
Some of these processes remain unfinished. 
  
Since the last century, Spanish and Portuguese reformists have been obsessed with 
making up the lost ground with modernized Europe. EU membership has been a critical 
step in this direction. 
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